The Pearl Harbor advanceknowledge conspiracy theory is the argument that U. S. Government officials had advance knowledge of Japans December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl. Watch breaking news videos, viral videos and original video clips on CNN. Autocad 2007 with Crack Keygen Free Download,Description Design, visualize, and document your ideas clearly and efficiently with AutoCAD software from. Microsoft Office Professional is software package with word processing and productivity applications, including Access, Accounting Express, Excel, Outlook, PowerPoint. Windows XP788. 110Server and Office 2016201320102007 Activation CRACKED. Thurmond Spence hearing, in April 1. Dorn Report. 1. 4 The inquiries reported incompetence, underestimation, and misapprehension of Japanese capabilities and intentions problems resulting from excessive secrecy about cryptography division of responsibility between Army and Navy and lack of consultation between them and lack of adequate manpower for intelligence analysis, collection, processing. Investigators prior to Clausen did not have the security clearance necessary to receive the most sensitive information, as Brigadier General Henry D. Russell had been appointed guardian of the pre war decrypts, and he alone held the combination to the storage safe. Clausen claimed, in spite of Secretary Stimson having given him a letter informing witnesses he had the necessary clearances to require their cooperation, he was repeatedly lied to until he produced copies of top secret decrypts, thus proving he indeed had the proper clearance. Stimsons report to Congress, based on Clausens work, was limited due to secrecy concerns, largely about cryptography. A more complete account was not made publicly available until the mid 1. Pearl Harbor Final Judgement. Reaction to the 1. Some regard it as a valuable addition to understanding the events,1. Clausen did not speak to General Walter Short, Army commander at Pearl Harbor during the attack, and called Clausens investigation notoriously unreliable in several aspects. Assertions that Japanese codes had already been brokeneditU. S. signals intelligence in 1. In the past, the U. S. MI 8 cryptographic operation in New York City had been shut down by Henry Stimson Hoovers newly appointed Secretary of State, citing ethical considerations, which inspired its now broke former director, Herbert Yardley, to write a 1. The American Black Chamber, about its successes in breaking other nations crypto traffic. Most countries responded promptly by changing and generally improving their ciphers and codes, forcing other nations to start over in reading their signals. The Japanese were no exception. Nevertheless, U. S. Stimsons action in two separate efforts the Armys Signal Intelligence Service SIS and the Navys Office of Naval Intelligence ONI crypto group, OP 2. G. Cryptanalytic work was kept secret to such an extent, however, commands such as the 1. Naval District at Pearl Harbor were prohibited from working on codebreaking by Admiral Kelly Turner as a consequence of the bureaucratic infighting in Washington. By late 1. 94. 1, those organizations had broken several Japanese ciphers, such as J1. PA K2, called Tsu and Oite respectively by the Japanese. The highest security diplomatic code, dubbed Purple by the U. S., had been broken, but American cryptanalysts had made little progress against the IJNs current Kaigun Ango Sho D2. Naval Code D, called AN 1 by the U. S. 2. 1 JN 2. March 1. In addition, there was a perennial shortage of manpower, thanks to penury on one hand and the perception of intelligence as a low value career path on the other. Translators were over worked, cryptanalysts were in short supply, and staffs were generally stressed. Furthermore, there were difficulties retaining good intelligence officers and trained linguists most did not remain on the job for the extended periods necessary to become truly professional. For career reasons, nearly all wanted to return to more standard assignments. However, concerning the manning levels,. World War II, the US had some 7. Of these, 8. 5 were tasked to decryption and 5. IJN codes. 2. 3 The nature and degree of these successes has led to great confusion among non specialists. Furthermore, OP 2. GY analysts relied as much on summary reports as on the actual intercepted messages. The U. S. was also given decrypted messages by Dutch NEI intelligence, who like the others in the BritishDutchU. S. agreement to share the cryptographic load, shared information with allies. However, the U. S. This was, at least in part, due to fears of compromise sharing even between the US Navy and Army was restricted. The eventual flow of intercepted and decrypted information was tightly and capriciously controlled. At times, even President Roosevelt did not receive all information from code breaking activities. There were fears of compromise as a result of poor security after a memo dealing with Magic was found in the desk of Brigadier General Edwin M. Pa Watson, the Presidents military aide. The Japanese code dubbed Purple, which was used by the Foreign Office and only for diplomatic but not for military messages, was broken by Army cryptographers in 1. A 1. 4 part message using this code, sent from Japan to its embassy in Washington, was decoded in Washington on 6 and 7 December. The message, which made plain the Japanese intention to break off diplomatic relations with the United States, was to be delivered by the Japanese ambassador at 1 p. Washington time dawn in the Pacific. Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, then serving as an aide to Marshall, took this to mean that the Japanese intended to attack at dawn somewhere in the Pacific. Marshall ordered a warning message sent to American bases in the area, including Hawaii. Due to atmospheric transmission conditions the message was sent out via Western Union rather than the usual signal channels and was not received until the attack was already underway. The JN 2. 5 superencrypted code, and its cryptanalysis by the US, is one of the most debated portions of Pearl Harbor lore. JN 2. 5 is the U. How do I add a version number field to an office 2. Click the Microsoft Office Button Button image, point to. Prepare, and then click Properties. In the Document Information Panel, click the arrow next to. 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